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Focusing on U.S. nonﬁnance industries, we examine the connection
between ﬁnancialization and rising income inequality. We argue that
the increasing reliance on earnings realized through ﬁnancial channels
decoupled the generation of surplus from production, strengthening
owners’ and elite workers’ negotiating power relative to other workers.
The result was an incremental exclusion of the general workforce from
revenue-generating and compensation-setting processes. Using timeseries cross-section data at the industry level, we ﬁnd that increasing
dependence on ﬁnancial income, in the long run, is associated with reducing labor’s share of income, increasing top executives’ share of compensation, and increasing earnings dispersion among workers. Net
of conventional explanations such as deunionization, globalization,
technological change, and capital investment, the effects of ﬁnancialization on all three dimensions of income inequality are substantial. Our counterfactual analysis suggests that ﬁnancialization could
account for more than half of the decline in labor’s share of income,
9.6% of the growth in ofﬁcers’ share of compensation, and 10.2% of the
growth in earnings dispersion between 1970 and 2008.

INTRODUCTION

Between 1980 and 2007, the ﬁnance sector share of proﬁts tripled from a
stable postwar average of 15% to a peak in 2002 of 45% of all proﬁts in the
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U.S. economy ðKrippner 2011; Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011Þ. For nonﬁnance-sector ﬁrms, the ratio of ﬁnancial income to realized proﬁts increased from 0.15 to 0.32, with a peak of 0.42 before the 2001 bust of the dotcom bubble. During the same period, on multiple dimensions, income inequality soared. The capital share of national income increased, as did the
compensation of top corporate executives. For full-time workers, the Gini
index of earnings inequality increased 26%. The level of income inequality
in the United States is now equivalent to that of developing countries such
as Iran, China, and Mexico.
The ﬁnancialization of the U.S. economy and rising income inequality
are two of the most profound economic developments of the last 50 years.
However, with few exceptions ðCrotty 2003; Palley 2008Þ, there is limited
discussion linking these two processes. This article examines the link between these two developments. We argue that, in addition to transferring
income into the ﬁnance sector ðTomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011Þ, the ﬁnancialization of the U.S. economy restructured social relations and income dynamics in the rest of the economy. We believe that ﬁrms’ increasing reliance
on ﬁnancial, rather than production, income decoupled the generation of
surplus from production and sales, strengthening owners’ and elite workers’
negotiating power against other workers. The result was an incremental exclusion of the general workforce from revenue-generating and compensationsetting processes.
We examine trends in industry-speciﬁc income dynamics as a function of
the ﬁnancialization of industry economic activities. Our estimates suggest
that increasing reliance on ﬁnancial income in the nonﬁnance sector, over
the long run, is associated with reducing labor’s share of income, increasing compensation for top ofﬁcers, and increasing earnings dispersion among
workers. The magnitudes of these effects are comparable to those of the prevalent explanations in the literature, including deunionization, technological
change, and globalization.
This article advances the literature in four ways. First, we further develop
the thesis that the ﬁnancialization of the U.S. economy at its core is a system
of redistribution that privileges a limited set of actors ðTomaskovic-Devey
and Lin 2011Þ. Second, we introduce ﬁnancialization as a critical institutional mechanism encouraging the post-1970s surge in U.S. income inequality.
This article also further explores the social consequences of the institutional
shift over the past three decades from managerialism to shareholder value
conceptions of the ﬁrm ðFligstein and Shin 2003, 2007; Davis 2009; Goldstein
2012Þ. Finally, we expand the analysis of income inequality to illustrate that
a multiactor framework of capitalists, top executives, and the general workforce ðSakamoto and Liu 2006Þ better captures recent income dynamics than
simpler capitalist-worker or human capital inspired skilled-unskilled distinctions.
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THE FINANCIALIZATION OF THE U.S. ECONOMY

Financialization can be broadly deﬁned as two interdependent processes,
both of which accelerated after the late 1970s. One is the rising dominance of
the ﬁnance sector and its conception of control in the U.S. economy; the
other is the increasing participation of nonﬁnance ﬁrms in the ﬁnancial services and investment markets. It is well established that, in the past three decades, the United States has undergone a fundamental transformation from a
manufacture-driven to a ﬁnance-orientated economy, during which increased
income shares accrue through ﬁnancial channels ðKrippner 2005Þ, and concurrently corporate governance is more and more responsive to and disciplined
by ﬁnancial rather than product markets ðFligstein 2001; Davis 2009Þ.
There is a growing literature examining the economic and social implications of ﬁnancialization. Most studies focus on the income transferred
into the ﬁnance sector. Epstein and Jayadev ð2005Þ ﬁnd that the rentier
share of national income, deﬁned as proﬁts of ﬁnancial ﬁrms and total
interest income over gross national product, went up signiﬁcantly among
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ðOECDÞ
countries after 1980. Sum and colleagues ð2008Þ show that the average
weekly wage in the investment bank and securities industry of Manhattan
is six times higher than the average wage of workers in Manhattan and
20 times higher than that of workers elsewhere in the United States. Importantly, Philippon and Reshef ð2009Þ ﬁnd that human capital does not
account for the excessive wage growth in the ﬁnance sector. Kaplan and
Rauh ð2010Þ show that an increasing fraction of the top-end income earners in the United States are investment bankers and institutional investors, while Godechot ð2012Þ observes similar development in France since
the mid-1990s. Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin ð2011Þ document the series of
political-institutional shifts in the United States that led to these income
transfers as both proﬁts and compensation, concluding that ﬁnancialization
was not a neutral product of market mechanisms but rather the result of
speciﬁc political decisions to deregulate existing ﬁnance activities and to
refrain from regulating new ﬁnancial products, in an era of expanding neoliberal governance ideologies and ﬁnance sector political inﬂuence.
In contrast to the attention received by the ﬁnance sector in both the
public and the academic spheres, few explore the ﬁnancialization of the
nonﬁnance sector. This article focuses on the second process of ﬁnancialization, that is, the increasing participation of nonﬁnance ﬁrms in ﬁnancial markets. Figure 1 presents the ratio of ﬁnancial income to realized proﬁts
for all nonﬁnance ﬁrms and for manufacturing ﬁrms from 1970 to 2007.2

2

We calculate realized proﬁts as the sum of accounting proﬁts before tax and the capital
consumption allowance.
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F IG . 1.—Financial income over realized proﬁts, 1970–2007. Data are from the Internal Revenue Service Corporation Complete Report, 1970–2007. Financial income is
calculated as the sum of interest, dividends, and net capital gains.

Financial income here consists of interest, dividends, and capital gains and
excludes income from the sale of goods and services. It shows that since the
late 1970s, ﬁnancial income has become a signiﬁcant stream of revenue
for U.S. corporations. For all nonﬁnance ﬁrms, the ratio was relatively stable
until the late 1970s. It then experienced a rapid growth, from below 0.20 in
1990s ðdue to the economic boom at that timeÞ, the reliance on ﬁnancial
income surged again to more than 0.4 during the dot-com bubble. A similar
pattern is observed among the subsample of manufacturing ﬁrms, but the
magnitude is even more striking: the dependence on ﬁnancial income for
these ﬁrms increased by a factor of three over the past 30 years, from 0.20 to
0.61. In other words, since about 2000, earnings generated through ﬁnancial
channels are larger than half of the total proﬁts earned by manufacturing
ﬁrms.3
Although the dependence of ﬁnancial income is higher among manufacturing ﬁrms, as
shown in ﬁg. 1, the national trend is not entirely driven by manufacturing ﬁrms. There is also
a signiﬁcant but less dramatic growth of ﬁnancial income for nonmanufacturing ﬁrms.

3
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While it is certain that ﬁnancialization greatly beneﬁts Wall Street, its
implication on Main Street remains obscure. Stockhammer ð2004Þ argues
that ﬁnancialization reshapes managerial priorities from the growth of market share to short-term proﬁts. At the national level, he shows that ﬁnancial income is negatively associated with new investment in ﬁxed capital.
At the ﬁrm level, Orhangazi ð2008Þ reports that increasing ﬁnancial income depresses production-related investment. Another set of literature
considers broader economic impacts. Crotty ð2003Þ argues that because it
crowds out investment in production, a probable result of ﬁnancialization
is slower growth of employment, real wages, and consumption. Similarly,
Palley ð2008Þ suspects that ﬁnancialization is responsible for the stagnation
of wages and the growth of income inequality in the United States. Across
developed countries, Zalewski and Whalen ð2010Þ ﬁnd a weak but growing
correlation ð0.184 in 1995 and 0.254 in 2004Þ between the International
Monetary Fund ﬁnancialization index and national income inequality. In
the United States, Volscho and Kelly ð2012Þ show that securities and real
estate bubbles are temporally associated with the concentration of income
at the very top. At the household level, Nau ð2011Þ shows that ﬁnancial
income accounts for more than 50% of the overall income inequality among
U.S. households in the 2000s. In all of these studies, the connection between
ﬁnancialization and distributional outcomes is speculated on rather than
directly examined.
RISING INCOME INEQUALITY

Coinciding in time with ﬁnancialization has been a remarkable growth of
income inequality in the United States. Three major developments are examined in this article: reducing labor’s share of national income, increasing
ofﬁcers’ share of compensation, and increasing earnings dispersion among
workers. We believe that examining all three developments provides a
fairly comprehensive account of income dynamics. The decline of labor’s
share of income, the emergence of extraordinarily high executive compensation, and the polarization of the general workforce are all critical dimensions of growing income inequality. Here, we discuss the common explanations of these developments and their potential limitations. It should be
emphasized that these explanations are not competing hypotheses in our
analytical framework. Rather, we treat them as confounding historical factors that should be addressed in inquiries of inequality trajectories. Indeed,
in many ways they are complementary aspects of a broader institutional
shift, as the Unites States moved from the postwar capital-labor accord to
a global and ﬁnancialized economy ðRubin 1995; Moller and Rubin 2008Þ.
The ﬁrst major development is labor’s declining share of national income. Studies on the capital-labor share have shown that, for developed
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countries, there was a steady increase of labor’s share beginning after
World War II, followed by a decline since the 1980s ðKristal 2010, 2011Þ.
The decline is largest among European countries ðHarrison 2002Þ, but a
signiﬁcant downward trend is also observed in the United States: between the 1970s and 2008, labor’s share in the private sector fell from 66%
to 60% of national income ðKristal 2011Þ.4 In contrast to national trends,
more volatility is observed at the industry level. Young ð2010Þ ﬁnds that
the national “constant” of labor’s share in the United States is rather a result
of long-run offsetting shift between labor’s declining share in manufacturing and small gains in service industries. Kristal ð2011Þ ﬁnds that the
large decline of labor’s share in the core industries ð14 percentage points
for manufacturing, 10 percentage points for transportation, and 5 for constructionÞ is partially offset by a smaller rise in labor’s share in ﬁnance and
service industries, resulting in a net 6 percentage-point decline of labor’s
share of national income since the 1970s.
A second development is the exponential increase in the income share
of top earners since the 1980s. Past studies indicate that the recent growth
of income inequality in the United States is, to a large extent, driven by the
concentration of income at the top end of the distribution ðPiketty and
Saez 2006; Lemieux 2007; Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez 2009Þ. Using individual tax returns data, Atkinson et al. ð2009Þ show that the top decile
income share increased from 31% of total income in the 1970s to 50% by
2007. The growth of the very top was even more rapid: the top 0.1% experienced a 370% growth in their share of national income, from 2.6%
in the 1970s to more than 12.3% in 2007. One might suspect that this
development reﬂects the increase in capital’s share of total income. Yet a
decomposition shows that compensation has become an increasingly important source of income for these top earners ðPiketty and Saez 2006;
Atkinson et al. 2009Þ. That is, elite workers now constitute a signiﬁcant
fraction of the highest-income population. This ﬁnding is consistent with
Bebchuk and Grinstein’s analysis ð2005Þ on executive compensation. Their
estimate shows that, net of changes in size and performance, the average
compensation for executives doubled from 1993 to 2003. DiPrete, Eirich,
and Pittinsky ð2010Þ show that this was accomplished in part by an institutional tying of executive pay to the pay of other “peer” executives, engineering an upward leapfrogging game in CEO compensation.
The third and probably the best-known income inequality development
is the increasing earnings dispersion among workers. Western and Rosenfeld ð2011Þ estimate a more than 40% increase in wage inequality between 1973 and 2007. The income divide widened along educational lines,
The downward trend has persisted through the late ﬁnancial crisis and reached an
unprecedented low in 2011 ðJacobson and Occhino 2012Þ.
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particularly between high school and college-educated workers. While college graduates earned 30% more than other workers in the late 1970s, the
premium doubled over the next few decades ðGoldin and Katz 2007Þ. The
labor market also has become more polarized, with the growth of employment concentrated at both tails of the skill distribution ðAutor, Katz, and
Kearney 2006; Kalleberg 2011Þ. Furthermore, studies indicate that the
driving forces behind the growth of income inequality have changed in the
past two decades. While an increase in wage differential was observed
across the distribution before 1990, the growth of inequality since then was
mostly driven by the increasing differential at the top end of the distribution ðLemieux 2007Þ.
Several hypotheses have been proposed to explain the rise in income
inequalities. The dominant explanation in labor economics is capital- and
skill-biased technological change. Researchers argue that the spread of information technology since the 1980s disproportionately increased the output of physical capital ðBlanchard 1997; Acemoglu 2003; Kristal 2011Þ and
the demand for skilled workers ðAcemoglu 2002; Kaplan and Rauh 2010Þ.
The decline of labor’s share, increased earnings inequalities, and the college
premium in this account mostly reﬂect technology-driven changes in marginal productivity. Although intuitive, this theory fails to explain several
empirical patterns. First, it does not provide a satisfying answer as to why
a comparable concentration of income is not observed in continental Europe or Japan ðPiketty and Saez 2006Þ, where similar technological changes
also took place. Second, neither does it explain why there is a larger decline
of labor’s share in Europe than in the United States. Third, the skill-biased
hypothesis is inconsistent with the growth in demand of labor at the bottom
of the skill distribution. Most important, this family of theory does not explain why the growth of wage dispersion slowed down while the development
of information technology took off in the late 1990s ðCard and DiNardo
2002Þ.
A second explanation is globalization. The proponents of this theory
argue that the global ﬂows of capital, goods, and labor reduce the bargaining power of workers in high-wage countries, particularly for workers
with limited skills. Studies show that, among the developed countries, international trade, foreign direct investment, and migration ﬂow are negatively associated with labor’s share of national income ðHarrison 2002; Kristal
2010, 2011Þ and positively associated with the level of income inequality
ðAlderson and Nielsen 2002; Lee, Nielsen, and Alderson 2007Þ. However, not
all workers in the developed countries suffer. Kaplan and Rauh ð2010Þ argue
that elite workers are likely to beneﬁt from globalization due to the combination of production and distribution scale and information technology.
Global competition for high-skilled labor might also increase their compensation ðFlorida 2005; Abella 2006Þ.
1290
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Morris and Western ð1999Þ reviewed the limitations of market explanations, suggesting that research should focus on institutional shifts such
as the decline of unionization. Subsequently, more studies have examined
labor market institutions. Researchers ﬁnd that occupational structure
ðWeeden 2002; Mouw and Kalleberg 2010Þ, terms of employment ðDiPrete
et al. 2006Þ, family structure ðMcCall and Percheski 2010Þ, performancepay practice ðLemieux 2007; Hanley 2011Þ, and employment concentration ðDavis and Cobb 2010Þ might all contribute to the observed income
dynamics. Among the institutional changes, the deunionization of the U.S.
workforce has received the greatest and most long-lasting attention. Kristal ð2010Þ ﬁnds there is a positive association between union density and
labor’s share of national income among developed countries. Piketty and
Saez ð2006Þ suspect that deunionization removed the barriers to excessive compensation for elite workers. Freeman ð1994Þ estimates that 20%
of the increase of earnings inequality among male workers in the 1980s
could be attributed to the decline of union members. Most recently, Western and Rosenfeld ð2011Þ estimate that deunionization accounts for oneﬁfth to one-third of the growth of U.S. wage inequality between 1973 and
2007.
While this political-institutional turn reveals the importance of social
practices in shaping income dynamics, limited attention has been paid to
ﬁnancialization. If there is one unexamined institutional innovation that is
critical to the rise in income inequality, we suspect that it is the ﬁnancial
innovations adopted by the U.S. corporations since the late 1970s.
THE LINK BETWEEN FINANCIALIZATION AND
INCOME INEQUALITY

We conceive of income inequality as a result of social relations between
sets of actors, in which interaction and its resulting institutions generate
greater advantages for some actors than for others ðTilly 1998, 2000Þ. Income distributions, whether between capital and labor or among workers
in various structural positions, reﬂect the relative bargaining and claimsmaking power of actors in a given organizational and environmental context ðTomaskovic-Devey et al. 2009; Avent-Holt and Tomaskovic-Devey
2010Þ. This power can be based on control of capital or positions, market
demand for goods or skills, or simply the persuasiveness of actors in a speciﬁc institutional and cultural context. From this perspective, deunionization
and globalization both reduced the claims-making power of labor, particularly blue collar workers. We suspect that the ﬁnancialization of nonﬁnance
ﬁrms also restructured the social relations between owners and workers, elite
and general workers, and employees in general, thus reshaping the relative
power of actors along these divides.
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The ﬁnancialization of the nonﬁnance sector has its roots in two prior
developments in the U.S. economy. First is the long-term reconﬁguration
of the U.S. corporate world in the 1960s and the 1970s. Because of global
manufacturing market saturation and antitrust legislation at that time,
large ﬁrms in the United States attempted to maintain proﬁtability by turning into multifunction cross industry conglomerates. A consequence was that
ﬁnance gradually rose as the metagovernance structure for the largest ﬁrms
in the United States ðFligstein 2001; Crotty 2003Þ. While managers and workers of the subunit possessed ﬁrm- and industry-speciﬁc human capital and
are thus committed to production and sales, the ﬁnancial managers at the top
began to conceive of subunits as tradable assets that should be evaluated,
eliminated, or acquired according to their expected returns. We believe that
the transition to the ﬁnance conception of the ﬁrm prepared the episteme and
techne to engage in ﬁnancial activities for nonﬁnance ﬁrms. This transition
accelerated in the 1980s when shareholder value goals began to dominate
corporate strategy, displacing long-term market share as the metric of CEO
success with goals of short-term proﬁtability and stock price gains ðDobbin
and Zorn 2005; Krier 2005; Davis 2009; Goldstein 2012Þ.
The second development was the 1970s crisis, during which a conﬁguration of threats to the U.S. economy, including the ﬁrst and second oil
crises, rising global competition, and stagﬂation, mobilized business elites
to reinvent the relationship between the private sector and the state ðMiller
and Tomaskovic-Devey 1983; Useem 1986; Harvey 2005; Hacker and Pierson 2010Þ. The result of this business insurgency was a new neoliberal order in which market logics increasingly replace social contracts, and the liquidity of capital is prioritized over long-term employment stability.
A series of deregulations and new policies were designed to unleash
capital ﬂow into the ﬁnancial markets ðTomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011Þ.
Most notably, Reagan-appointed banking regulators started to give nonﬁnance ﬁrms permission to engage in ﬁnancial activities but exempted
them from the scope of regulatory agencies. Further ﬁnancial deregulation
proceeded through the 1990s, culminating in the 1999 Financial Services
Modernization Act, which scrapped the only remaining prohibitions in the
1933 Glass-Steagall Act. What ensued in the last quarter of 20th century was
an explosion of government, corporate, and household debt and an everexpanding securities market.
The combination of a growing demand to maximize proﬁts and minimize ﬁxed capital investment and the increasing proﬁt opportunities born
of ﬁnancial deregulation steered nonﬁnance ﬁrms to look into ﬁnancial
markets as an alternative channel to “grow fast in a slow-growth economy”
(Welch and Byrne 2003, app. A). Instead of investing in physical capital to
expand production, executives increasingly allocated their resources into
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ﬁnancial venues. The result was a growing number of nonﬁnance ﬁrms
participating in ﬁnancial services and investment.
The most well-known operations of this type might be the ﬁnancial arms
of automobile manufacturers. General Motors established its ﬁnancial arm,
General Motors Acceptance Corporation ðGMACÞ, in 1919, and Ford established its ﬁnancial service provider, Ford Motor Credit, in 1959. Before
the 1980s, the main function of these ﬁnancial institutions was to provide
their automotive customers access to credit to increase car sales. These ﬁnancial institutions were tolerated by regulation at the time because they
made loans solely to their customers ðOrhangazi 2008Þ. Yet starting in the
1980s these auxiliary institutions broadened their portfolio. GMAC entered
mortgage lending, a ﬁnancial service unrelated to their automotive products,
in 1985. In the same year, Ford purchased First Nationwide Financial Corporation to enter the savings and residential loan markets. In the 1990s,
GMAC and Ford Motor Credit expanded their services to include insurance, banking, and commercial ﬁnance. In 2004, GM reported that 66% of
its $1.3 billion quarterly proﬁts came from GMAC, while a day earlier,
Ford reported a loss in its automotive operation but $1.17 billion in net
income, mostly from its ﬁnancing operation ðHakim 2004Þ.
The most aggressive and successful border crossing was pioneered by
General Electric. Founded in 1943, GE Capital was designed to provide
loans for the customers of home appliances. However, under the post-1980
leadership of Jack Welch, its scope rapidly expanded to small business
loans, real estate, mortgage lending, credit cards, and insurance.5 After
running a close second for decades, it topped GMAC as the largest nonbank lender in 1992. In recent years, the ﬁnancial unit consistently brought
in more than half of the proﬁts for GE ðKocieniewski 2011Þ.
Sears, one of nation’s largest retailers, entered the real estate brokerage
and securities businesses in 1981. It issued the Discover Card in 1985, a
one-stop ﬁnancial services credit card that also offered savings accounts.
Some of these ﬁnancial services were later sold in the 1990s when proﬁtability dipped. Yet this does not mean that the retailer returned to the
“one-big-store” business model. After its merger with Kmart, Sears and
Kmart stores became a retail business that generated cash ﬂow to be diverted to ﬁnancial investments. A year before the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, a
third of Sear’s pretax income was generated by high-risk ﬁnancial trades
ðCho 2007Þ. AT&T started its ﬁnancial arm in 1985, entered the smallbusiness loan market in 1992, and soon became one of the largest nonbank
lenders. In the early 2000s, Target earned about 15% of its proﬁt from
credit card operations ðHenry 2005Þ. Before its bankruptcy in 2001, En5

In fact, GE is the ﬁrst foreign company that entered the life insurance industry in Japan.
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ron was more of a commodities and derivatives trading company than an
energy company. It created the market for electricity trading and had
trading ﬂoors that processed $2.5–$3 billion of commodities trading a day
ðJohnson 2001Þ.
These cases represent a striking trend in non-ﬁnance-sector business
activity. A Wall Street analyst estimates that almost 40% of the earnings of
the companies in the Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index in 2000 were from
lending, trading, venture investments, and other ﬁnancial activities, a third
of which were earned by nonﬁnancial companies ðIp 2002Þ. For top executives with ﬁnancial backgrounds, investment in the ﬁnancial market is
functionally equivalent to investment in production and sales but with the
advantages of higher capital liquidity, lower transaction costs, and more
ﬂexible labor costs.
We expect this reliance on ﬁnancial income has profound distributional
consequences. First, the reliance on ﬁnancial income implies that resources
are reallocated away from workers and production to the ﬁnancial unit
and ﬁnancial markets, decreasing the potential growth and stability of the
core business. In the case of Sears, because a signiﬁcant proportion of the
cash ﬂow generated by retail outlets was channeled into ﬁnancial operations, fewer resources were available for store improvement and advertisement. One example is that Sears spent only $1.5–$2 per square foot to
update their stores, in contrast to the industry standard of $6–$8 ðLahart
2011Þ. Second, unlike production and sales, ﬁnancial income is nominally
external and independent of the production workforce. Thus, this stream
of revenue decouples surplus and production and, we suspect, enhances
the negotiating power of owners and executives in the compensationsetting and surplus distribution process.
In addition, because we see effective claims over income to be governed
at least in part by rhetorical strategies and status hierarchies in organizations, the rise of ﬁnance as an ascendant cultural value in U.S. society
ðDavis 2009Þ is likely to have increased the perceived status and worth of
ﬁnancial investments and, as a result, reduced the relative status of production. The shift in CEO compensation from a product market share benchmark to stock market performance evaluations certainly suggests that this
might have been the case. That this happened while unions were declining
and the state was retreating from employee protections of all kinds also
meant that there were no countervailing cultural or political pressures to preserve the relative power of workers, particularly workers associated with
the production of goods or services. Thus, we think it plausible that, as ﬁnancialization advanced across speciﬁc ﬁrms and industries, the relative
power of labor declined, enhancing the claims of capital, top executives, and
perhaps some specialized workers over the income accumulated by ﬁrms.
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We examine three hypotheses at the industrial level on the effects of
ﬁnancialization on income dynamics and discuss potential mechanisms
behind the connection.
HYPOTHESIS 1.—Increased dependence on income through ﬁnancial channels is associated with a future decline in labor’s share of income.
We see the proximate mechanism here to be that workers’ power to
make claims on organizational revenue is undermined when managerial
attention and investments are allocated away from the core business to
either ﬁnancial service units or ﬁnancial markets. More distal mechanisms
might include the cultural devaluation of production, the drop in capital
investment in production, and the retreat from market share as the core
growth strategy of the ﬁrm.
HYPOTHESIS 2.—Increased dependence on income through ﬁnancial channels is associated with a future increase in executives’ share of compensation.
An increase in ﬁnancial earnings for a nonﬁnance ﬁrm is often interpreted as a success of management in promoting shareholder value. Thus,
it is likely to raise the top executives’ bargaining power. That top executives’ incomes are increasingly tied to short-term ﬁnancial performance
and that the stock market now values companies via an examination of
returns on capital investment is well known. Compensation schedules for
top executives, however, are determined by the boards of directors instead
of stock market analysts. Thus, we suspect that, as ﬁnancialization progresses at the ﬁrm level, corporate boards will be converted to the logic of
ﬁnancialization from the earlier logic of maximizing market share in determining CEOs’ and other top executives’ compensation.
HYPOTHESIS 3.—Increased dependence on income through ﬁnancial channels is associated with a future increase in earnings dispersion among employees.
Firm dependence on ﬁnancial income is also likely to increase the claimsmaking power of managerial and ﬁnance-related workers relative to the
production and sales workforce. A likely outcome is an increasingly uneven
distribution in earnings among workers. The mechanisms here can be about
both the declining status of production workers and production units as well
as the increasing power of upper-level management and ﬁnancial units.
DATA, VARIABLES, AND METHOD

Data
We compiled integrated time-series cross-section data at the industry level
for 1970–2008. Most variables are drawn from the corporate tax return statistics published by the Internal Revenue Service ðIRSÞ and the National
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Income and Product Accounts published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis
ðBEAÞ. Since both accounts are primarily estimated from tax reports and
subject to auditing and adjustment, they are more reliable than conventional
survey or business press data. In addition, we obtain measures of import
penetration for extractive and manufacturing industries from the Structural
Analysis data set published by the OECD ðOECD-STANÞ and estimates of
industrial concentration by aggregating ﬁrm information from the Compustat database published by Standard & Poor’s. Workforce earnings and
characteristics are estimated by aggregating individuals in the Current Population Survey ðCPSÞ. Appendix A provides a discussion of all data sources.
The scope of our analysis is the nonﬁnance and nonagricultural private
sector economy from 1970 to 2008. Due to the shift in industrial classiﬁcation
from the standard industrial classiﬁcation ðSICÞ to the North American industry classiﬁcation system ðNAICSÞ, our analysis is divided into two periods.
In the ﬁrst period, from 1970 to 1997, there are 35 SIC industries, and in the
second period, from 1998 to 2008, there are 40 NAICS industries. We exclude
holding companies in the second period because they are essentially ﬁnancial ﬁrms, especially after the Financial Services Modernization Act. We retain residual industrial categories such as “other manufacturers” or “other
services” to present the national trends but exclude them from the regression
analysis. The unit of analysis is industry-year. The sample size is 945 industryyears for the ﬁrst period and 400 for the second period. Appendix B provides
a list of all industries included in the regression analysis.
Because earnings inequality measures are not available at the ﬁrm level,
we test our hypotheses at the industry level. Given that the increase in income
inequality in the past three decades occurred mostly within rather than between industries ðMorgan and Tang 2007; Kim and Sakamoto 2008Þ, industry is a sensible unit for an institutional analysis of income inequality.
Organizational studies have repeatedly demonstrated that there is similarity
among organizations within the same industry, reﬂecting both market and
institutional mechanisms. We treat industry as a technical and normative
ﬁeld that inﬂuences ﬁrm behavior. There is substantial evidence indicating the strong presence of industry ﬁeld effects in terms of a ﬁrm’s human resource practices around gender and race ðSkaggs 2008; Hirsh 2009;
McTague, Stainback, and Tomaskovic-Devey 2009; Kelly et al. 2010Þ. Thus,
an industrial investigation is likely to provide informative estimates of ﬁrmlevel processes.
Our analysis cannot distinguish direct within-organization from indirect between-organization within-industry effects of ﬁnancialization. Rather,
it will capture both direct ﬁrm and indirect industry ﬁeld effects of ﬁnancialization on income distributions. If the ﬁnancialization of revenue increases the bargaining power and thus the earnings of a set of actors in one
organization, then a likely outcome, especially when the organization is domi1296
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nant in its organizational ﬁeld, is that parallel actors in other organizations
would demand comparable increases in compensation.
Variables
The central explanatory variable in our analysis is industry-level ﬁnancialization. We follow Krippner’s ð2005Þ measure and calculate it as the ratio
of ﬁnancial receipts—which include interest, dividends, and capital gains—
to business receipts, the revenue generated from the selling of goods and services.6 Figure 2 presents the trajectories of ﬁnancialization for nonﬁnance
industries. Each trajectory here is estimated with an industry-speciﬁc regression of the ﬁnancialization ratio on year and has two components. One is the
constant or the initial level of ﬁnancialization ðY-axisÞ; the other is the slope
or the average yearly growth ðX-axisÞ.
Figure 2 shows that there is a signiﬁcant industrial variance with regard to the trajectory of ﬁnancialization, a pattern that was not identiﬁed
in earlier macroeconomic accounts of ﬁnancialization ðe.g., Crotty 2003;
Krippner 2011Þ. Industries that had the greatest ﬁnancialization growth
between 1970 and 1997 were tobacco, motor vehicle, oil and gas extraction, and communications, followed by electrical and electronic, stone, clay,
and glass, and chemical products. In this period, almost all industries
showed a growth in their dependence on ﬁnancial income. In the second
period, ﬁrms in some industries such as electrical equipment and products
demonstrated rapid growth in their reliance on ﬁnancial income, while other
industries such as printing and publishing, broadcasting and telecommunication, waste management, and petroleum and coal products showed
gradual decline.
Comparing ﬁgure 2a with ﬁgure 2b shows that there was a collective
movement toward ﬁnancialization in the ﬁrst period. With few exceptions
ðlumber and wood, paper and allied products, and constructionÞ, most industries show positive growth in their reliance on ﬁnancial income. This
probably reﬂects the fact that most ﬁnancial deregulation took place between the late 1970s and the late 1990s ðKrippner 2011Þ. The second period,
in contrast, shows divergence, particularly among industries that were more
6
Taxable interest, a component of total receipts, included interest on U.S. government
obligations, loans, notes, mortgages, arbitrage bonds, nonexempt private activity bonds,
corporate bonds, bank deposits, and tax refunds. The statistics also included dividends
from savings and loans and mutual savings banks, federal funds sold, ﬁnance charges,
and sinking funds. Dividends included those received from domestic or foreign corporations. Capital gains refers to net capital gains and is calculated as the sum of “net
short-term capital gain reduced by net long-term capital loss” and “net long-term capital
gain reduced by net short-term capital loss.” Business receipts are deﬁned as gross operating receipts reduced by the cost of returned goods and allowances. Investment, incidental income, and gains from the sale of assets are not included in this measure.
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F IG . 2.—Industrial trajectories of ﬁnancialization, 1970–2008. a, standard industrial
classiﬁcation, 1970–97; b, North American industry classiﬁcation system, 1998–2008.

ﬁnancialized in the beginning of the period. They were likely to either move
further along this path or show large decline in the next decade. Those of low
dependence in the beginning of the period, however, showed little change.
Thus, we would expect that the impact of ﬁnancialization on income in1298
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equality would be more profound between 1970 and 1997 than in the later
period.
We examine three income inequality measures. First, we focus on labor’s share of income. The conventional measure of labor’s share is to
divide total compensation by value added ðKristal 2010Þ. However, since
our primary concern is the social relation between workers and owners,
the conventional measure is inappropriate. Value added includes taxes on
production and imports, the earnings of the government, but excludes government subsidies that directly increase ﬁrm earnings. We use the sum of
compensation and gross operating surplus, instead of value added, as the
denominator in our measure of labor’s share. Figure 3a presents the trend
of labor’s share of income from 1970 to 2008. Due to business cycles, there
is signiﬁcant ﬂuctuation of labor’s share of income.7 Yet the secular trend
is clear: labor’s share in the nonﬁnance, nonagricultural economy dropped
from about 0.7 at the beginning of the period to about 0.65 at the end of
the time series.
The second dependent variable of interest is ofﬁcers’ share of compensation. Ofﬁcers are the highest-level executives in corporations, including
positions such as chief executive ofﬁcer, chief operating ofﬁcer, and chief
ﬁnancial ofﬁcer. According to ExecuComp, a business executive compensation database published by Standard & Poor’s, the average number of
unique executives in publicly traded ﬁrms was 6.7 in 1994 and 5.9 in 2004
ðKaplan and Rauh 2010Þ. We obtain estimates of total ofﬁcers’ compensation at the industry level from the corporate tax return statistics published
by the IRS. The item includes salaries, wages, stock bonuses, bonds, and
other forms of compensation but not qualiﬁed deferred compensation, such
as contributions to a 401ðkÞ plan. This suggests that to some extent we
underestimate the real growth of ofﬁcers’ compensation in our analysis.
We calculate ofﬁcers’ share of compensation by dividing ofﬁcers’ compensation by the total compensation of all workers in a given industry.
In other words, we measure their share by asking what proportion of labor income is captured by the six or seven top executives. Figure 3b presents
the trend in ofﬁcers’ share of compensation. It shows a steady increase in
ofﬁcers’ capture of labor income from about 6% of total labor income in
1970 to about 9% in 1990. The share returned to more than 8.5% in 1996
and slowly declined to about 7.5% in 2008.8 Overall, ﬁgure 3b shows that
7
The amount of compensation over time is more stable than the amount of surplus. Thus,
labor’s share tends to be lower during economic booms and higher during the busts. This is
also why there was a hike of labor’s share after the dot-com bubble burst in 2000.
8
Due entirely to an unexplained drop in ofﬁcers’ compensation in the “other service”
industry, the ofﬁcers’ share at the aggregate level drops to about 7% between 1986 and
1995. Since there is no industry reclassiﬁcation during this period, we suspect this
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F IG . 3.—Income dynamics, nonﬁnance, and nonagricultural economy, 1970–2008.
a, Labor’s share of income; b, ofﬁcers’ share of compensation; c, earnings dispersion.
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there is, in relative terms, a 20% growth of ofﬁcers’ share of labor income
in the past four decades. Furthermore, since ofﬁcers’ compensation is a
fraction of total compensation, this result indicates that the decline of
income share for nonofﬁcer workers is greater than previously observed.9
Finally, we examine industry-wide earnings dispersion. We restrict the
scope of this measure to the core workforce, deﬁned as full-time and fullyear workers ages 25–55. This restriction avoids the interferences of parttime, school attendance, and retirement trends. We then adjust the earnings
for top coding and inﬂation into 2001 U.S. dollars and exclude workers with
annual earnings equal to or lower than $100.10 We measure earnings inequality as the variance of log annual earnings. Figure 3c presents the overall earnings dispersion trend. Consistent with previous studies, it shows that,
from 1970 to 2008, the level of compensation-related income inequality increased from 0.34 to 0.47, or by about 40%. A variance decomposition shows
that before the early 2000s, there was virtually no growth of between-industry
variance in the nonﬁnance sector of the U.S. economy. Thus, most of the
growth in variance occurred within rather than between industries.
Table 1 presents the variables, technical deﬁnitions, and sources used in
our analyses. A series of variables representing the most prevalent explanations of increased income inequality are incorporated as controls.11
Union density is measured by the percentage of the workforce reporting
to be union members in both the CPS May ð1970–82Þ and Merged Outgoing
Rotation Group ﬁles ð1983–2008Þ. Because the question on union membership was not asked in 1970, 1971, and 1982, we impute industry-speciﬁc
predictions using the data points from 1973 to 1981. We expect that union
density would have a positive effect on labor’s share of income ðKristal
2010Þ and a negative effect on earnings dispersion ðWestern and Rosenfeld
2011Þ. In the previous literature, declining union density tends to be the
reﬂects some measurement error or short-term accounting change at the IRS. To smooth
the trend, we impute the ofﬁcers’ share of compensation for the “other service” industry
between 1986 and 1995 with spline estimates. This does not affect our analysis because
the “other service” industry is excluded from the sample.
9
Although the absolute ratios are small, any increase reﬂects a signiﬁcant income transfer
into a small set of executives. For example, a 1% rise in 1970 represents US$ð1970Þ15 billion
and US$ð2011Þ86 billion. By 2008, a 1% increase in executive compensation transferred US
$ð2011Þ233 billion to corporate executives.
10
Following Philippon and Reshef’s treatment ð2009Þ, we multiply the top-coded earnings
until 1995 by a factor of 1.75.
11
We do not include measures of occupation in our models. We conceptualize occupations as endogenous to ﬁrm and industry. They are the backbones of the internal divisions of labor within ﬁrms. There is not a sufﬁcient sample size within the CPS to produce stable occupation estimates within industry within year. We do assume that most
of the income inequality growth we observe in ﬁg. 3b is produced by internal income
distributions tied to occupational distinctions between jobs.
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CPS May ﬁles, 1970–82, and Merged
Outgoing Rotation Group ﬁles, 1983–2008

Union members / workers

Computer hardware and software investment / nonresidential
ﬁxed assets investment
Imports / ðproduction 2 exports 1 importsÞ
College graduates / workers
Non-Hispanic white men / workers
Three largest ﬁrms / total revenue
Full-time-equivalent employees / total full-time-equivalent employees
Capital consumption allowance / total capital consumption
allowance of nonagricultural, nonﬁnancial private economy

BEA National Income and Product Accounts

BEA National Income and Product Accounts
OECD Structural Analysis
CPS Integrated Public Use Microdata Series
CPS Integrated Public Use Microdata Series
Compustat
BEA National Income and Product Accounts

BEA National Income and Product Accounts
IRS corporate tax return statistics; BEA National
Income and Product Accounts
CPS Integrated Public Use Microdata Series

Compensation / ðcompensation 1 gross operating surplusÞ
Ofﬁcers’ compensation / total compensation

Variance of log earnings

IRS corporate tax return statistics

Source

Financial receipts / business receipts

Technical Deﬁnition

NOTE.—Since smaller industries have few observations in the CPS, we smoothed the control variables from CPS with a locally weighted moving average.
a
Inﬂation and top-coding adjusted.
b
1970, 1971, and 1983 are imputed.
c
Extractive and manufacturing industries only.

Import penetrationc . . . . . . . .
College . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Non-Hispanic white men . . .
Industrial concentration . . . . .
Employment size . . . . . . . .
Capital consumption . . . . . . .

Computer investment . . . . . .

Earnings dispersiona . . . . . . .
Control:
Union densityb . . . . . . . . . .

Independent:
Financialization . . . . . . . . . .
Dependent:
Labor’s share . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ofﬁcers’ share . . . . . . . . . . .

Variable

TABLE 1
Variables, Sources, and Technical Deﬁnitions
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single most important institutional predictor of increased income inequality.12
To account for capital- and skill-biased technology change, we control
for computer investment. It is measured as the investment in computer
hardware and software over total nonresidential ﬁxed assets investment.
To account for the effects of globalization, we control for import penetration in extractive and manufacturing industries. It is calculated as total
imports over total domestic sales. We expect that both variables are negatively associated with labor’s share ðHarrison 2002; Kristal 2010, 2011Þ
but positively associated with earnings inequality ðAcemoglu 2002, 2003;
Alderson and Nielsen 2002Þ.
To account for changes in the skill level of the workforce, we control for
education level of the workforce in the regression analysis. It is measured by
the fraction of the workforce that has a college education. A higher value
indicates that a larger proportion of the workforce is skilled workers. The
education level is expected to have a positive effect on labor’s share of income. To account for the effects of the changing demographic composition
of the U.S. workforce, we control for the proportion of the workforce that
was non-Hispanic white men. Although prior studies of income inequality
have not included this variable, workplace level studies have repeatedly
shown that race and gender status inﬂuence claims-making power ðTilly
1998; Tomaskovic-Devey et al. 2009Þ, and we expect that a decrease in nonHispanic white men would result in a long-term decline of labor’s share.
In addition, we control for industrial concentration to account for longterm within-industry compositional shifts. This is measured by the revenue of the three largest ﬁrms over total industry revenue. We also control
for the relative size of the workforce and capital intensity for betweenindustry shifts in the composition of the economy. The former is measured
as the number of full-time-equivalent employees in the industry over total
full-time-equivalent employees of the nonagricultural and nonﬁnancial
economy. The latter is measured by industry capital consumption over
national capital consumption. We expect that an increase in relative capital intensity in the long run would lead to a decrease in labor’s share of
income. We do not have a prediction for the association of capital investment with ofﬁcers’ compensation and earnings dispersion.
Method
We examine the connection between ﬁnancialization and income inequality
with single-equation error correction models ðECMs; see Beck 1991; De Boef
12

We appreciate one of the reviewers pointing out that, in the economic literature, the
fall of real minimum wage is the dominant explanation for rising inequality in the 1980s.
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and Keele 2008Þ.13 A recent application of ECMs in sociology is Kristal’s
analysis of labor’s income share ð2010Þ, in which she suggests that workingclass organizational power has both instantaneous and long-term effects on
labor’s share of national income. We take a more conservative approach
and focus on the long-run effects in our analysis. This is because interpreting the contemporaneous coefﬁcient as an instantaneous effect is only
appropriate when the causal direction is ﬁrmly established. Financialization and income distributions in the same year tend to be endogenous since
resources are simultaneously allocated to ﬁnancial investments, labor, capital, or management. The interpretation of the long-run effect, by contrast,
does not require an implausible causal assumption and is consistent with our
theoretical argument that ﬁnancialization reshapes the long-term social relations between the actors.
To absorb the interferences of time-constant industrial trends and yearspeciﬁc economy-wide shocks, we include ﬁxed-effect terms ði.e., random
interceptsÞ for both industry and year in the models. This procedure also
ensures that the estimates are derived from within-industry variance in the
rate of change instead of unobserved between-industry differences. Furthermore, we report panel-corrected standard errors ðBeck and Katz 1995Þ in
our analysis, which correct for serial- and year-clustered heteroscedasticity.14
The single-equation ECMs in our analysis are speciﬁed as15
DYi; t 5 a0 1 a1; i 1 a2; t 2 b1 Yi; t21 1 b2 Xi; t21 1 εi; t ;
where DYt denotes the ﬁrst difference Yt 2 Yt21 , a0 denotes the grand
mean, a1, i denotes industry-speciﬁc deviation in change, a2, t denotes year13

It should be noted that the ECMs, autoregressive distributed lag models, and partial
adjustment models are equivalent in their autoregressive nature ðDe Boef and Keele
2008Þ. We use ECMs because the long-run effect and its standard error can be estimated
more directly than in the other two speciﬁcations.
14
White robust standard errors and industry-clustered robust standard errors yield
substantively identical results.
15
We restrict the contemporaneous coefﬁcient to zero in our analysis for the following reasons. First, as mentioned, interpreting contemporaneous coefﬁcients requires the assumption of contemporaneous exogeneity. We expect the explanatory variables to be contemporaneously endogenous to the outcome variables, so the inclusion of contemporaneous
terms leads to the problem of overcontrol. Second, our theoretical model does not suggest
any industry-wide instantaneous effect of the independent variables on the dependent variables. Third, with the sample size we have, including the contemporaneous term would either limit the number of the control variables in the model or induce a collinearity problem.
Finally, when we include the contemporaneous terms, most contemporaneous coefﬁcients
are statistically nonsigniﬁcant. We also ﬁnd no substantive difference in the long-run relationship between ﬁnancialization and three income inequality measures in the alternative
speciﬁcation.
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speciﬁc deviation, b1 denotes the adjustment or error correction rate of Y,
and b2 denotes the direct effect of Xt21 on DYt. The model shows that,
conditional on other covariates, a unit increase in Yt21 leads to a b1 unit
decrease in DYt and therefore a 1 2 b1 unit increase in Yt. Therefore, the
long-run, cumulative effect of a unit increase in X on Y is not only b2 but
the sum of an inﬁnite geometric series:
`

o b ð1 2 b Þ ;
k

2

1

k50

where k represents the number of discrete time units following the direct
effect. This geometric series converges into b21
1 b2 . To directly estimate the
long-run effect of X and its standard error, we estimate the Bewley ð1979Þ
model with the predicted DY ðsee app. C for the reparameterization of the
modelsÞ:
21
21
21
21
Yi; t 5 b21
1 a0 1 b1 a1; i 1 b1 a2; t 2 b1 ð1 2 b1 ÞDYi; t 1 b1 b2 Xi; t21 1 εi; t :

Three sets of models are estimated in our analysis. We examine the longrun effects of ﬁnancialization on labor’s share of income, ofﬁcers’ compensation, and earnings dispersion ðsee app. D for additional estimates on 90:50,
75:25, and 50:10 ratiosÞ. We expect that the reliance on ﬁnancial income will
have a negative effect on labor’s share and positive effects on ofﬁcers’ compensation and earnings dispersion. For each set of models, three equations are
estimated. We examine the hypotheses on nonﬁnance industries from 1971 to
1997 ðI 5 35, T 5 28Þ and from 1999 to 2008 ðI 5 40, T 5 10Þ. To account
for the impact of import penetration, we also estimate a separate model for
extractive and manufacturing industries between 1971 and 1997 ðI 5 23,
T 5 28Þ. We do not estimate this model between 1999 and 2008 because we
have only a few industries with information on this variable ðI 5 17Þ and few
observations per industry ðT 5 10Þ. To detect the inﬂuence of speciﬁc industries and examine the robustness of our ﬁndings, jackknife analysis is
conducted by excluding one industry at a time for all equations.
RESULTS

Tables 2–4 present the long-run effects and the error correction rates of the
models predicting labor’s share of income, ofﬁcers’ compensation, and earnings dispersion, respectively. It should be noted that the error correction
rates in all models are fairly small, indicating that the dependent variables
are persistent over time and the causal impact of the independent variables
tends to spread slowly across the three dimensions of income dynamics.
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Labor’s Share
We start by examining the relationship between ﬁnancialization and labor’s share of income. Table 2 shows that the model estimates support our
hypothesis, that is, increased dependence on earnings through ﬁnancial channels tends to decrease labor’s share of total income in the long run. The directions of the effect are consistent across the three models. A 1% increase
in the reliance on ﬁnancial income is associated with between a 0.9% and a
3.7% decrease of labor’s share in the long run. The jackknife analysis shows
that the effects of ﬁnancialization in both periods are robust. In the ﬁrst period, the effects range from 24.81 ðpanel-corrected standard error 5 0.131Þ to
21.978 ð0.074Þ. In the second period, the effects range from 21.248 ð0.118Þ
to 20.713 ð0.065Þ.
Between 1971 and 1997, average union density of the nonﬁnance private
sector dropped from 25.35% to below 10%. Conditional on other factors,
industries with stronger decline in union density subsequently tend to have
greater decline in labor’s share of income. This result is consistent with previous ﬁndings that union density is positively associated with labor’s share of
income ðKristal 2010Þ. Yet the average effect of unionization turns negative
between 1999 and 2008. This result is consistent with the ﬁnding that the
effect of union membership on labor’s share is declining in the postaccord
period ðWallace, Leicht, and Raffalovich 1999Þ.
TABLE 2
The Long-Run Effects and the Error Correction Rate:
Predicting Labor’s Share of Income
EXTRACTIVE AND
MANUFACTURING

ALL NONFINANCE INDUSTRIES
1971–97
VARIABLE

1971–97

Coefﬁcient PCSE Coefﬁcient PCSE Coefﬁcient PCSE

Financialization . . . . . . . . . . 23.492*** .101
Union density . . . . . . . . . . . .
.731*** .016
Computer investment . . . . . . 2.233*** .014
College . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.874*** .030
Non-Hispanic white men . . .
.032
.019
Industrial concentration . . . . 2.115*** .008
Employment size. . . . . . . . . .
4.394*** .095
Capital consumption . . . . . . . 2.953*** .152
Import penetration . . . . . . . .
Error correction rate. . . . . . . 2.066**
.025
N. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
945
2
.190
R .....................
NOTE.—PCSE 5 panel-corrected SE.
* P < .05.
** P < .01.
*** P < .001.
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1999–2008

2.882***
2.906***
2.727***
2.367***
.880***
.052**
8.697***
.850***

.070
.066
.084
.081
.084
.017
.627
.143

2.207*

.085
400
.414

23.659*** .127
.849*** .023
2.027
.028
.743*** .038
.332*** .024
2.313*** .018
5.792*** .350
.403
.300
2.320*** .018
2.073*
.029
621
.200
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Table 2 also shows a signiﬁcant impact of investment in computer technology. In both periods, the estimates show that an increase in investment in
computer technology leads to a future decrease in labor’s share of income.
However, when import penetration is controlled, the effect does not hold for
extractive and manufacturing industries between 1971 and 1997, which
were presumably most affected by the introduction of computer technology.
As for the effect of education, the estimates show that, between 1971 and
1997, an increase in the proportion of workers who have a college education tends to result in an increase in labor’s share. The average estimate
turns negative in the second period. Nevertheless, the jackknife analysis
shows that this change of direction is entirely driven by the computer and
electronic product manufacturing industry, an industry with a high- and
increasingly high-skilled workforce but a decreasing share of labor’s income between 1999 and 2008. Once the industry is excluded from the analysis, the average coefﬁcient is a positive 0.49 with a panel-corrected standard error of 0.069.
The effect of the race/gender employment composition is signiﬁcant, and
the direction is consistent with our expectation. A decrease in the proportion of workers who are non-Hispanic white men leads to a long-run
decrease in labor’s share of income, net of the changes in the skill level of
the workforce. The effect seems to be particularly strong among extractive
and manufacturing industries and when import penetration is controlled.
A 1 percentage-point decrease in the proportion of workers who are white
men leads to about a 0.332 percentage-point decrease in labor’s share of
income.
The effect of import penetration on labor’s share of income supports
the globalization thesis. Between 1971 and 1997, a 1% increase in import
penetration, in the long run, leads to a 0.32% decrease in labor’s share of
income among extractive and manufacturing industries.
Ofﬁcers’ Compensation
Table 3 presents the estimates of models predicting ofﬁcers’ share of compensation. Conﬁrming our core hypothesis, an increase in the degree of ﬁnancialization is associated with a long-run increase in ofﬁcers’ share of compensation. The jackknife analysis shows that the effect is robust in the ﬁrst
period, ranging from 0.582 ð0.018Þ, when excluding the amusement and recreation services industry, to 0.264 ð0.010Þ, when excluding tobacco manufactures. In the second period, the effect is not as conclusive, ranging from 0.143
ð0.011Þ, when the motion picture and sound recording industry is excluded
from the analysis, to 20.192 ð0.017Þ, when the electrical equipment, appliance, and component manufacturing industry is removed.
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TABLE 3
The Long-Run Effects and the Error Correction Rate:
Predicting Ofﬁcers’ Compensation
EXTRACTIVE AND
MANUFACTURING

ALL NONFINANCE INDUSTRIES
1971–97
VARIABLE

1999–2008

Coefﬁcient PCSE

Financialization. . . . . . . . . . .
.411***
Union density . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.031***
Computer investment . . . . . .
.065***
College . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.027***
Non-Hispanic white men . . .
.187***
Industrial concentration . . . .
.026***
Employment size. . . . . . . . . . 21.579***
Capital consumption . . . . . . . 2.230***
Import penetration . . . . . . . .
Error correction rate . . . . . . . 2.050*
N. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
945
.232
R2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.015
.002
.002
.003
.005
.001
.029
.012
.020

Coefﬁcient
.093***
2.166***
.313***
2.064***
2.0313***
.074***
22.412***
.001
2.086

PCSE Coefﬁcient PCSE
.010
.011
.021
.005
.002
.005
.084
.017
.054

400
.538

1971–97

.360***
.009***
2.031***
.092***
.190***
.046***
2.835***
.250***
.028***
2.060*
621
.285

.016
.002
.002
.003
.006
.002
.035
.015
.002
.026

NOTE.—PCSE 5 panel-corrected SE.
* P < .05.
** P < .01.
*** P < .001.

The effect of union density on ofﬁcers’ relative compensation is negative
and signiﬁcant in both periods, indicating that a decrease in union density
in the long run led to an increase in ofﬁcers’ share of compensation.16
Although the average effect in the third set of analysis is positive, the jackknife analysis shows the estimate turns into a signiﬁcant 20.015 ð0.002Þ,
when excluding the coal mining industry. These results are consistent with
Piketty and Saez’s ð2006Þ intuition that a labor union might hinder the increase of ofﬁcers’ share of income, and the decline in union density led to a
concentration of income at the top of the distribution.
The effect of computer investment on ofﬁcers’ share of compensation is
mixed. Although the average effect is positive and signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst period, the jackknife analysis shows that the result is driven by the business
service industry alone. Once it is excluded, the average coefﬁcient is 20.044
16

It should be noted that, since we model the compensation for the ofﬁcers relative to
total compensation, a negative coefﬁcient does not always imply an absolute decrease in
offers’ compensation. In fact, because union density is positively associated with labor’s
share of income, it is actually positively associated with ofﬁcers’ absolute compensation.
This ﬁnding is consistent with a previous ﬁnding that union density is positively associated with managerial pay ðRosenfeld 2006Þ. One explanation of such a relationship
might be that a labor union lifts the wage and salary at the bottom of the hierarchy and
consequently increases the compensation at the very top ðHedström 1991Þ.
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with a standard error of 0.002. A similar result is found among extractive
and manufacturing industries when import penetration is controlled. In contrast, the effect is positive and robust in the second period, ranging from 0.414
ð0.027Þ to 0.194 ð0.014Þ, which is consistent with the skill-biased technological change thesis.
With regard to within- and between-industry compositional effects, the
result shows that high industrial concentration in the long run is associated
with a higher ofﬁcers’ share of compensation. The relation is robust in all
three sets of analysis. The effect of relative employment size, as expected, is
negatively associated with ofﬁcers’ compensation.
Earnings Inequality
Table 4 presents the estimates for models predicting industry-wide earnings dispersion. It shows a long-run positive relationship between the dependence on ﬁnancial income and earnings dispersion between 1971 and
1997. The jackknife test shows that this positive relationship is robust, and
the estimates range from 1.215 ð0.104Þ to 0.333 ð0.103Þ. The relationship
remains robust among the extractive and manufacturing industries when
import penetration is controlled, which similarly ranges from 1.413 ð0.12Þ
to 0.573 ð0.113Þ. In the second period, the average effect of ﬁnancializaTABLE 4
The Long-Run Effects and the Error Correction Rate:
Predicting Variance of Log Earnings
EXTRACTIVE AND
MANUFACTURING

ALL NONFINANCE INDUSTRIES
1971–97
VARIABLE

1999–2008

1971–97

Coefﬁcient PCSE Coefﬁcient PCSE Coefﬁcient PCSE

Financialization. . . . . . . . . . .
1.017***
Union density . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.036*
Computer investment . . . . . .
.155***
College . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.049*
Non-Hispanic white men . . .
.161***
Industrial concentration . . . . 2.127***
Employment size. . . . . . . . . . 2.655***
Capital consumption . . . . . . . 22.787***
Import penetration . . . . . . . .
Error correction rate . . . . . . . 2.088**
N. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
945
.174
R2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.101
.017
.013
.022
.036
.010
.080
.117
.034

.010
2.900***
2.692***
2.028
.0804*
2.121**
21.219***
21.982***

.074
.126
.145
.061
.040
.040
.229
.285

2.182**
.067
400
.547

1.197***
.032
.090***
.179***
.211***
2.085***
.549
23.332***
.115***
2.116*
621
.152

.114
.024
.024
.026
.047
.016
.301
.206
.023
.051

NOTE.—PCSE 5 panel-corrected SE.
* P < .05.
** P < .01.
*** P < .001.

1309

American Journal of Sociology
tion turns nonsigniﬁcant. The jackknife analysis shows that the estimates
range from 0.575 ð0.084Þ, when excluding the motion picture and sound
recording industry, to 21.202 ð0.202Þ, when excluding the electrical equipment, appliance, and component manufacturing industry ðagain, both are
outliers with regard to the level of ﬁnancializationÞ. When excluding these
two industries simultaneously, the average effect is 1.7 with a standard error
of 0.294. Thus, for most industries even in the later period, ﬁnancialization
remains associated with increased earnings inequality.
The direction of union density is consistent with previous ﬁndings that
labor unions tend to reduce income dispersion ðWestern and Rosenfeld
2011Þ. Yet among extractive and manufacturing industries, the dynamic
effect of union density appears to be trivial when import penetration is
controlled. Computer investment, consistent with expectations, has a positive and robust effect on earnings dispersion between 1971 and 1997. The
effect turns negative in the second period, but it is entirely driven by the
pipeline transportation industry. Once it is excluded, the average coefﬁcient
is 0.342 with a standard error of 0.131. This result is in agreement with
the skill-biased hypothesis that there is increasing employee skill differentiation with the introduction of computer technology.
As for gender and racial composition, the estimate shows that percentage of white males is positively associated with earnings dispersion in the
ﬁrst period. Yet the jackknife analysis indicates this result is entirely
driven by the tobacco industry. Once it is removed, the coefﬁcient turns
to 20.572 with a standard error of 0.029. A similarly negative effect is
also observed in the second period. Both indicate that the retreat of nonHispanic white men in an industry is often followed by an increase in earnings dispersion.
For extractive and manufacturing industries in the ﬁrst period, the impact of import penetration is positive and robust. This result is consistent
with a previous ﬁnding that the global ﬂow of goods tends to increase income inequality ðAlderson and Nielsen 2002Þ.
Table 4 also shows that industries with a higher concentration tend to
have lower earnings dispersion in the later period. The effect is robust
between 1970 and 1997 but inconclusive between 1999 and 2008. Although
perhaps counterintuitive, this ﬁnding resonates with a recent cross-national
ﬁnding that employment concentration is negatively associated with the
level of income inequality ðDavis and Cobb 2010Þ. Furthermore, table 4
shows that industries with shrinking relative employment tend to develop
higher earnings dispersion. In other words, industries that are declining are
more likely to experience subsequent surges in the level of income inequality. However, the effect becomes trivial among extractive and manufacturing industries once import penetration is controlled.
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Counterfactual Analyses
Finally, we examine the impact of ﬁnancialization on income dynamics
with a series of counterfactual estimates derived from these models ðsee
app. E for technical detailsÞ. That is, we contrast the observed inequality
trend to what it might have been if the reliance on ﬁnancial income is ﬁxed
at the 1970 level through the time series, on the basis of the model estimates
with industries weighted to represent their relative size on the dependent
variable. The difference between the observed trend and the counterfactual trend can therefore be interpreted as the net impact of ﬁnancialization
that was realized in the observed time period. Figure 4 presents the counterfactual estimates for ﬁnancialization on income inequality. The left column
presents the observed and the counterfactual trends, and the right column
represents the differences between two trends across time.
We ﬁrst examine the impact of ﬁnancialization on labor’s share of income,
which is presented in the ﬁrst row of ﬁgure 4. It shows that the counterfactual
trend closely follows the observed trend before 1980 and starts to diverge
in the early 1980s. The gap quickly widens in the next two decades to a
3 percentage-point difference in 2000. Then the gap ﬁrst declines to about
2 percentage points in the mid-2000s but rapidly returns to about a 2.5
percentage-point difference. If we contrast the observed labor’s share of
income with the counterfactual, the difference indicates that ﬁnancialization
accounts for about 73% of the decline in labor’s share between 1970 and 1997
and 58% of the total decline between 1970 and 2008.
The second row of ﬁgure 4 presents the impact of ﬁnancialization on ofﬁcers’ share of compensation. It shows that, in contrast to labor’s share of
income, ﬁnancialization has a relatively modest effect on ofﬁcers’ compensation. Yet it is clear that the counterfactual estimates are constantly lower
than the observed trend, and most yearly differences are signiﬁcant at 0.05
level. The gap ﬁrst grows to 0.17 percentage points in the 1970s and returns
to about 0.07 percentage points in the ﬁrst half of the 1980s. The gap then
widens again in the early 1990s and exceeds 0.2 percentage points, respectively, in 1994 and the early 2000s, which is followed by a convergence of
the two trends to between 0.15 and 0.1 percentage points. Overall, the counterfactual analysis suggests about 6.3% of the increase in ofﬁcers’ compensation between 1970 and 1997 and 9.6% of the increase between 1970 and
2008 is associated with the increasing reliance on ﬁnancial income by nonﬁnance ﬁrms.
The last row of ﬁgure 4 presents the counterfactual estimates for ﬁnancialization on earnings dispersion. It shows that the counterfactual overlaps with the observed trend not only in the 1970s but also in the early 1980s,
during which earnings dispersion starts to soar. The two trends start to diverge in the late 1980s, when the observed trend grows faster than the coun1311
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F IG . 4.—Counterfactual estimates for ﬁnancialization on income inequality

terfactual. The gap then quickly widens in the 1990s and further expands in
the later part of the 2000s to a more than 0.02 difference in variance of log
earnings. At the end of the time series, the counterfactual analysis suggests
that ﬁnancialization is associated with 9.1% of the growth in earnings dis-
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persion between 1970 and 1997 and about 10.2% of the growth between 1970
and 2008. In comparison, Western and Rosenfeld’s ð2011Þ estimate from an
individual-level model is that the decline in unionization was responsible for
20% ðwomenÞ and 34% ðmenÞ of the growth in earnings inequality between
1973 and 2007. The counterfactual estimate from our models is that unionization was associated with 14.8% of the growth in earnings dispersion, net of
other industry-level controls. Thus, the impact of ﬁnancialization on earnings
dispersion is almost as large as that of declining unionization.
CONCLUSION

Using an integrated industry panel data set, this article examines the
connection between the ﬁnancialization of the U.S. economy and rising
income inequality in the nonﬁnance sector from 1970 to 2008. We show
that the reliance on earnings through ﬁnancial channels has grown signiﬁcantly since the 1980s in the nonﬁnance sector, particularly in manufacturing industries. We also show that there are nontrivial temporal and
industrial variances with regard to the trajectory of ﬁnancialization, which
have been largely overlooked in the literature. While there was a collective
movement of ﬁnancialization among industries between 1970 and 1997,
the trajectories diverged between 1998 and 2008, with the electrical equipment and products industry showing the strongest continued growth.
We argue that ﬁnancialization of the U.S. economy at its core is a system
of redistribution that privileges a limited set of actors. In addition to the
growing income transfer into the ﬁnance sector ðTomaskovic-Devey and
Lin 2011Þ, we think that the increasing reliance on income through ﬁnancial channels restructured the social relations and the income dynamics in
the nonﬁnance sector. Substituting production and sales investment with
ﬁnancial investment decoupled the generation of surplus from production,
strengthening owners’ and elite workers’ negotiating power against other
workers. The result was a structural and cultural exclusion of the general
workforce from revenue-generating and compensation-setting processes.
The empirical analysis provides evidence for our thesis. The reliance on
ﬁnancial income, in the long run, is associated with reducing labor’s share
of income, increasing top executives’ share of compensation, and increasing
earnings dispersion among workers at the industry level. Furthermore,
the analysis shows that the sizes of the effects are substantial, net of conventional explanations such as deunionization, globalization, technological
change, and capital investment. The counterfactual analysis indicates that
ﬁnancialization accounts for about half of the decline in labor’s share of
income, 9.6% of the growth in ofﬁcers’ share of compensation, and 10.2%
of the growth in earnings dispersion between 1970 and 2008. In addition,
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the period, sector, and industry jackknife estimates for the relationship
between ﬁnancialization and all three outcomes suggest a more general and
stable process than many conventional explanations of rising inequality in
the literature.
Our analysis conﬁrms previous ﬁndings that deunionization is associated with long-run decline in labor’s share of income ðKristal 2010Þ, increasing income concentration at the top ðPiketty and Saez 2006Þ, and
growing income dispersion among workers ðWestern and Rosenfeld 2011Þ.
The effects of computer investment on income dynamics, however, are
mixed. While there is evidence suggesting a connection between computer
investment and earnings dispersion, its effects on ofﬁcers’ compensation
and labor’s share of income are mixed. For extractive and manufacturing
industries, we ﬁnd that the global inﬂow of goods indeed led to a long-run
decline in labor’s share of income and an increase in earnings dispersion.
In addition, our analysis identiﬁes two new mechanisms that require
further investigation. We ﬁnd that, net of skill level and union density, the
proportion of workers who are non-Hispanic white men is positively associated with labor’s share of income and negatively associated with earnings dispersion. We also ﬁnd that industrial concentration is negatively associated with labor’s share of income but positively associated with ofﬁcers’
compensation. We see both results as consistent with the thesis that income
dynamics are shaped by the relative bargaining and claims-making power of
actors in their organizational contexts.
Furthermore, our analysis indicates that the generic income distribution
processes might operate differently due to historical and industrial contexts. While union density is generally believed to have a positive effect
on labor’s share of income, our analysis shows that the relation turned
negative in the later period, a likely outcome of the normative shifts in U.S.
society ðWallace et al. 1999Þ. Another example is the effect of education.
Although the skill level of the workforce mostly has a positive relation
with labor’s share of income, it is not the case in the computer and electronic product manufacturing industry, in which we observe an increasingly high proportion of workers with a college degree but a decline in labor’s share of income. On reﬂection, the industrial heterogeneity is perhaps
not surprising. Industries varied a great deal in their initial levels and trajectories of ﬁnancialization, unionization, exposure to global competition,
and relative investment in computer technology. These historical and industrial heterogeneities challenge the monolithic depiction in the existing literature and invite further examination on the industry-speciﬁc income dynamics.
Overall, our analysis contributes to the emerging institutional accounts
of rising income inequality in the United States ðDiPrete et al. 2010;

1314

Financialization and U.S. Income Inequality
Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011; Western and Rosenfeld 2011Þ. Most fundamentally, we introduce ﬁnancialization as a consequential source of growing income inequality. Empirically, we advance the literature with a set of
models that simultaneously examine multiple sources of inequality on multiple dimensions. This approach also gives us greater conﬁdence that the
link between ﬁnancialization and income dynamics is unlikely to be spurious.
An alternative interpretation of the effect of ﬁnancialization on inequality is that the productivity of managers and capital has risen as a
result of ﬁnancial investment strategies. If this was the case, then increases
in capital’s and ofﬁcers’ share of income simply reﬂect increases in their
marginal productivity in the era of ﬁnancialization. We ﬁnd this interpretation unsatisfying on multiple levels. First, since productivity is not
observed but inferred circularly in terms of income distributions, any
marginal productivity interpretation is tautological in essence. Second, this
interpretation depicts productivity as an individual attribute rather than
an organizational outcome that is embedded in a particular social conﬁguration of production. Previous studies and anecdotal evidence have demonstrated that the ﬁnancial activities operated by nonﬁnance ﬁrms are
often heavily backed by the cash ﬂow and the assets generated by production ðOrhangazi 2008Þ.17 Thus, the increase in “marginal productivity”
of the top executives and ﬁnancial workers often comes with the price of
diminishing investments in the “marginal productivity” and job security of
other workers. Third, the marginal productivity thesis tends to conceive
of compensation as a product of inevitable market or technological forces
but dismisses its very political and social nature. In this case, it is clear that
income dynamics are strongly associated with the ﬁnancialization of the
U.S. economy, which was a result of identiﬁable ideological, political, and
institutional developments since the late 1970s ðDavis 2009; Krippner 2011;
Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011Þ.
Our theoretical misgivings notwithstanding, we explored some empirical results that should hold if ﬁnancialization strategies were in fact
good business practices. First, we estimate a series of industry-level Cobb17

One well-known case in the business sphere is that of Gary Wendt. Before Wendt was
hired by Conseco to rescue the company’s troubled situation, he worked as the head of
GE Capital and was considered not only a skillful and visionary leader but also “the
smartest businessman in the country” (Mlodinow 2008, p. x). The appointment of Wendt
was then highly applauded by ﬁnanciers and investors. One quote in the New York
Times stated that “we know God can’t come down here and do this, but the next best
thing to God is Gary Wendt” (Morgenson 2002). An immediate result of such approval
was that Conceco’s stock tripled within a year. However, two years later, Conseco went
bankrupt, and its stock value crashed.
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Douglas production functions to explore the changes in output elasticities
for labor, nonﬁnancial assets, and ﬁnancial assets between 1970 and 2008
ðsee ﬁg. F1Þ. We ﬁnd no growth in the productivity of ﬁnancial assets, and
ﬁnancial assets consistently underperformed nonﬁnancial assets in the production function.18 We also developed a ﬁrm-level analysis that indicates
that ﬁnancialization does not translate into higher proﬁt. Firms that reported
interest income or ﬁnancial investment or owned a ﬁnancial subsidiary did
not earn signiﬁcantly more pretax income than other ﬁrms. In fact, industrywide dependence on ﬁnancial income is associated with a future decline in
proﬁts for nonﬁnance ﬁrms in the period of analysis ðsee app. FÞ.
We believe the marginal productivity thesis is therefore best identiﬁed as
a special case of the general claims-making process in shaping and reproducing compensation practices rather than a general theory of wage determination. That is, we consider it to be one of the discourses widely adopted
by actors to make claims about their contribution and worthiness to the
organization and to negotiate against other sets of actors. The growing dependence on earnings through ﬁnancial channels accentuates the social divides between capital and labor and between management and general
workers, thus legitimating claims made by capital and top executives in the
compensation-setting process. Certainly the rapid decline in unionization
meant that in most industries there was no organized countervailing actor
to press labor’s claim for an increased share or alternative production strategies.
We restrict the scope of analysis to labor’s share of income, ofﬁcers’
share of labor income, and earnings dispersion among workers. Yet these
were by no means the sole social consequences of ﬁnancialization. One
potential outcome of ﬁnancialization at the organizational level is the reduction of employment. Coinciding with the growth of GE Capital in the
1980s was a 50% reduction of GE employment, both by selling off production units and by slashing employment in the remaining units. Jack
Welch thus earned the nickname “Neutron Jack”—like a tactical atomic
bomb turning people into dust but leaving buildings still standing ðNew
York Times 2001Þ. If ﬁnancialization also leads to a long-run reduction of
employment, we are likely to underestimate its effect on labor’s share of
income and ofﬁcers’ compensation since relative employment size is included in the models. Another potential outcome is diminishing job opportunities for core business workers. After a series of cost-cutting measures to channel resources from the retail to the ﬁnancial operation, Sears,
once the nation’s third largest retailer, can no longer compete with other
retailers such as Walmart, Best Buy, and Kohl’s ðGreenberg 2008Þ. This
18

Financial assets include securities, loans, mortgages, and investment in government obligations.
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also suggests that we might understate the effect of ﬁnancialization by
controlling for relative capital consumption. A third possibility is the decrease of investment in innovation. Researchers ðLazonick 2010, 2011Þ
claim that, because ﬁnancial operation extracts resources of the ﬁrm into
ﬁnancial markets, it undermines the capacity of the ﬁrm to invest in innovation. We believe these hypotheses are plausible and worth further
empirical examination.
Our empirical approach prohibits us from exploring regional variance in
ﬁnancialization and income inequality trajectories. We suspect that the
effects of ﬁnancialization and other explanatory variables are not constant
across different regions. We expect the effect of ﬁnancialization to be less
salient in the right-to-work and southern states where workers traditionally had lower collective bargaining power to begin with. Hanley ð2010Þ has
shown that it is the undermining of worker power in other regions that
generated increased income inequality that came to resemble the higher
inequality that was always present in the South. However, as ﬁgure 2 demonstrates, ﬁnancialization strategies were widespread across industries,
and so it seems likely that they would be widespread regionally as well.
Up to this point we have treated ﬁnancialization, theoretically and
empirically, as an independent causal force, potentially changing the balance of power between various actors in production. In this way we describe ﬁnancialization as a complement to union density, globalization, and
market premiums for skilled work or capital investment as potential explanations of increasing income inequality. A stronger claim might be that
ﬁnancialization also contributed to the drop in union density, increases in
global production strategies, up-skilling of production processes, and declines in capital investment. Such a claim would be consistent with Davis’s
ð2009Þ argument that ﬁnancialization is a new cultural value infusing all
aspects of the economy. Harvey ð2010Þ has argued that ﬁnancialization
was central to the neoliberal political project, which he ties to all of these
outcomes as well. If this were the case, all of the primary mechanisms
currently identiﬁed as driving the rise in income inequality might be in part
a product of the more fundamental ﬁnancialization of the economy. In
such an expanded account, because ﬁnancialization weakens workers’
bargaining power and encourages managers to avoid investments in production, it leads to declining unionization as production is subcontracted
globally. Financialization might also lead to a net up-skilling of a ﬁrm’s
labor force as educated managerial and professional workers are required
to manage the investment function of ﬁrms, even as fewer production
workers are employed. We do not test these possibilities in this article but
invite further investigation to disentangle the relations among ﬁnancialization and the more common explanatory variables in inequality trend
models such as deunionization, globalization, and technological change.
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APPENDIX A

Data Sources
IRS Corporate Tax Return Statistics
We obtained the measures of ﬁnancial receipts, business receipts, ofﬁcers’
compensation, and total deductions from table 6 of the Return of Active
Corporations in the Corporation Complete Report published by the IRS
ðhttp://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Corporation-Complete-ReportÞ.
The estimates were derived from a stratiﬁed representative sample of all
returns of active corporations organized for proﬁt that are required to ﬁle
one of the 1120 forms that are part of the Statistics of Income program. The
statistics before 1994 were not in machine-readable format at the time of
data collection and only in the hard copies of the IRS annual Publication
16 or corporation income tax returns or as image ﬁles on the website. We
thus scanned and converted the documents between 1970 and 1993 into
machine-readable format with an optical character recognition program.
The data between 1994 and 2008 are available at the IRS tax statistics
website in machine-readable format. See the introduction ðsec. 1Þ, “Description of the Sample and Limitations of the Data” ðsec. 3Þ, and “Explanation of
Terms” ðsec. 5Þ in the Corporation Complete Report for more information.
BEA National Income and Product Accounts
We obtained the measures of total compensation, gross operating surplus,
full-time-equivalent employees, and capital consumption allowance from
the National Income and Product Accounts published by the BEA ðhttp://
www.bea.gov/national/Þ. Total compensation was obtained from table 6.2,
Compensation of Employees by Industry. Gross operating surplus was obtained from the Gross Domestic Product by Industry Data as a component
of value added. The estimate of full-time-equivalent employees was obtained
from table 6.5, Full-Time Equivalent Employees by Industry. Computer investment was obtained from Detailed Data for Fixed Assets and Consumer
Durable Goods ðhttp://www.bea.gov/national/FA2004/Details/Þ. Capital consumption allowance was obtained from table 6.22, Corporate Capital Consumption Allowance. All measures are available at the BEA website.
OECD Structural Analysis
We obtained the measure of import penetration from the STAN indicators
published by the OECD ðhttp://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId522211Þ.
The STAN indicators can be found under the theme “Industry and Services” and within Structural Analysis ðSTANÞ databases.
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Compustat
We calculated the measure of industrial concentration from the Compustat
North America database published by Standard & Poor’s, which is commonly
used in the analysis of business ﬁnancial activities. The database is proprietary and therefore not accessible to the public. However, most research universities and institutions subscribe to the database.
Current Population Survey
We obtained the measure of union density using the CPS May Extracts,
1970–82, and Merged Outgoing Rotation Group ﬁles, 1983–2008. Both data
sets are hosted by the National Bureau of Economic Research ðNBERÞ and
available at their website ðhttp://www.nber.org/Þ. We obtained other workforce measures from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series-CPS.
APPENDIX B
TABLE B1
Industries
Standard Industrial
Classiﬁcation, 1970–97
Metal mining

Machinery, except
electrical
Coal mining
Electrical and electronic
equipment
Oil and gas
Motor vehicles and
extraction
equipment
Nonmetallic minerals, Transportation
except fuels
equipment,
except motor
vehicle
Construction
Instruments and
related products
Food and kindred
products
Transportation
Tobacco
manufactures
Communication
Textile mill
Electric, gas, and
products
sanitary services
Apparel and other
textile products
Wholesale
Lumber and wood
products
Retail
Furniture and
Hotels and other
ﬁxtures
lodging places

North American Industry
Classiﬁcation System, 1998–2008
Mining
Utilities
Construction

Wholesale
Retail
Air, rail, and water
transportation

Food, beverage, and
tobacco
Truck transportation
Textile mill products Transit and ground
passenger
transportation
Apparel, leather, and Pipeline
other textile
transportation
products
Lumber and wood
Other transportation
products
and support
activities
Paper and allied
Warehousing and
products
storage
Printing and
Motion picture
publishing
and sound
recording
Petroleum and coal
Broadcasting and
products
telecommunications
Chemicals and allied Information
products
services and data
processing services
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TABLE B1 (Continued )
Standard Industrial
Classiﬁcation, 1970–97
Paper and allied
products
Printing and
publishing
Chemicals and
allied products
Petroleum and coal
products
Rubber and
plastics products
Leather and leather
products
Stone, clay, and glass
products
Primary metal
industries
Fabricated metal
products

Personal services
Business services
Auto repair,
miscellaneous
repair services
Amusement and
recreation services

North American Industry
Classiﬁcation System, 1998–2008
Rubber and
miscellaneous
plastics products
Nonmetallic
mineral products
Primary metal
industries

Professional,
scientiﬁc, and
technical services
Administrative
and support
services
Waste management
and remediation
services

Fabricated metal
products
Machinery, except
electrical
Computer and
electronic products

Educational services
Health care and social
assistance
Other arts,
entertainment,
and recreation
Electrical equipment, Amusement,
appliance, and
gambling, and
components
recreation
Transportation
equipment
Accommodation
Furniture and related Food services and
products
drinking places

APPENDIX C

Reparameterization from Error Correction
to the Bewley Model
We transform the equation from the ECM to the Bewley model to directly
estimate the long-run effect and its standard error. It should be noted that,
since we restrict the contemporaneous coefﬁcient to zero, the transformation here is slightly different from that of the conventional Bewley model.
We start with
DYi; t 5 a0 1 a1; i 1 a2; t 2 b1 Yi; t21 1 b2 Xi; t21 1 εi; t :
The goal of the reparameterization is to directly estimate b21
1 b2 and its standard error. To do so, we ﬁrst add Yi; t21 on both sides of the equation:
Yi; t 5 a0 1 a1; i 1 a2; t 1 ð1 2 b1 ÞYi; t21 1 b2 Xi; t21 1 εi; t :
We then subtract ð1 2 b1 ÞYi; t from both sides:
b1 Yi; t 5 a0 1 a1; i 1 a2; t 2 ð1 2 b1 ÞDYi; t 1 b2 Xi; t21 1 εi; t :
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Finally, we divide both sides with b1:
21
21
21
21
Yi; t 5 b21
1 a0 1 b1 a1; i 1 b1 a2; t 2 b1 ð1 2 b1 ÞDYi; t 1 b1 b2 Xi; t21 1 εi; t :

Predicted DY obtained in the error correction mode is used as a regressor to
obtain a consistent estimate of b21
1 b2 .
APPENDIX D
TABLE D1
The Long-Run Effects: Predicting Different Inequality Measures
90:50 RATIO
VARIABLE
1971–97:
Financialization. . . . . . . . . .
Union density . . . . . . . . . . .
Computer investment . . . . .
College. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Non-Hispanic white men. . .
Industrial concentration . . .
Employment size . . . . . . . . .
Capital consumption . . . . . .
N. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
R2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1999–2008:
Financialization. . . . . . . . . .
Union density . . . . . . . . . . .
Computer investment . . . . .
College. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Non-Hispanic white men. . .
Industrial concentration . . .
Employment size . . . . . . . . .
Capital consumption . . . . . .
N. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
R2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

75:25 RATIO

50:10 RATIO

Coefﬁcient PCSE Coefﬁcient PCSE Coefﬁcient PCSE
.181*** .011
2.009*** .002
.017*** .002
2.011*** .002
.014**
.004
.013*** .002
2.048*** .014
.067*** .012
945
.161

.202*** .00991
2.013*** .00216
.012*** .00153
2.010*** .00282
2.007*
.00363
2.031*** .00108
2.161*** .0172
2.051*** .0109
945
.130

2.431*** .031
2.017*** .003
2.009*** .002
.125*** .005
.089*** .008
2.028*** .002
.122*** .022
2.129
.015
945
.129

.012
.006
.037*** .008
.203*** .019
.083*** .008
2.053*** .007
.012*** .004
.139*** .041
2.123*** .021
400
.438

.086*** .014
.009
.009
.229*** .025
.096*** .010
2.007*
.003
.016*** .004
.375*** .045
.345*** .037
400
.341

2.009
.007
2.038**
.012
.093*** .007
.007
.006
.045*** .004
2.028
.005
.257*** .055
.040**
.015
400
.546

NOTE.—PSCE 5 panel-corrected SE.
* P < .05.
** P < .01.
*** P < .001.

APPENDIX E

Counterfactual Estimates
We obtain the counterfactual trends by estimating the full model with the
observed data, creating a counterfactual data set that holds ﬁnancialization constant at the 1970 level, and then generating predicted values for
the dependent variable. We document some technical details here.
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First, because Y is path dependent in the data-generating process, we
calculate predicted DY sequentially. That is, we use Y^i; t to generate D Y^i; t11 ,
then use Y^i; t11 to generate DY^i; t12 . Second, we calculate the observed nonﬁnance sector trends with variable industry-year weights. For labor’s
share, we use the sum of compensation and gross operating surplus; for
ofﬁcers’ share of compensation, we use total labor compensation; and for
earnings dispersion, we use employment size. We add back other service
to the aggregate trends and the counterfactual estimation so that they are
consistent with the observed trends presented in ﬁgure 3. Before 1998 the
other service residual category grows in size. The NAICS adds service
industries and reduces the inﬂuence of this industry category on observed
trends. Adding other service back into the counterfactual estimates is not
substantively consequential for the estimated size or trend. For earnings
dispersion, we add back the between-industry variance to present the total
variance to make it comparable with observed earnings dispersion trends
in ﬁgure 3c.
Third, we use the difference between the observed value and the counterfactual estimate at the end of the ﬁrst time series to smooth the 1970–97 and
1998–2008 trends. That is, instead of starting the counterfactual trend for
the second period from the observed value of Y in 1998, we start the counterfactual trend from the observed value in 1998 plus the difference between
the observed value and the counterfactual estimate in 1997. Finally, it should
be noted that our counterfactual analysis assumes an independent relation
among explanatory variables. We do not consider the potential effect of
holding ﬁnancialization at its 1970 level on the dynamics of other explanatory variables. As discussed in the conclusion, this assumption is contestable.
Financialization is likely to be closely associated with other variables such as
employment size or capital consumption. Thus, the counterfactual estimate
might understate the impact of ﬁnancialization.
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APPENDIX F
TABLE F1
The Long-Run Effects: Predicting Pretax Income
ERROR CORRECTION
Coefﬁcient

SE

2185.6**
275.6***
16.70
6,955.8***
62.29
40.87
248.68
523.7***
12.93
2149.7
27,454.0***
3,035.4***
1,505.2
443.7

lnðassetsÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
lnðrevenueÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
lnðemploymentÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Foreign income/revenue . . . . . . . .
Report interest income . . . . . . . . .
Report ﬁnancial investment. . . . . .
Own ﬁnancial subsidiary. . . . . . . .
Debt-equity ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . .
lnðno. of 3-digit industriesÞ . . . . . .
Industry union density . . . . . . . . .
Industry ﬁnancialization . . . . . . . .
Industry return on assets. . . . . . . .
Industry computer investment . . . .
Industry revenue concentration . . .
Adjusted R2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Observations/ﬁrms ðﬁrm-yearsÞ . . .

59.84
72.85
37.84
1,218.2
34.99
32.09
135.7
126.2
22.15
788.4
1,655.3
767.0
902.8
389.1
.1724
15,583

NOTE.—Data are from Standard & Poor’s Compustat. Sample is public nonﬁnance ﬁrms
ever listed in Fortune 500 between 1980 and 2005. The estimation strategy is similar to the
industry-level analysis in the article. Firm and year ﬁxed effects are included in the model. All
values are inﬂation adjusted. SEs are adjusted for clustering at the industry level.
* P < .05.
** P < .01.
*** P < .001.
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F IG . F1.—Estimated industry-level output elasticities of nonﬁnancial assets, ﬁnancial
assets, and labor, 1970–2008. We specify the industry-level Cobb-Douglas production
function as V 5 ALa Kb Fg , where V denotes industry-wide total value added; A denotes
total factor productivity; L denotes labor input; K denotes nonﬁnancial assets input; F
denotes ﬁnancial assets input; and a, b, and g denote, respectively, the output elasticities
of labor, nonﬁnancial assets, and ﬁnancial assets. Samples are identical to those in the rest
of this article.
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